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Onthebasisofpostulatesderived fromcognitive-behavioral theory,researchandtherapy,theauthorsexploredtheextent towhich
older adults’ cognitive beliefs of a just world and their perspectives on future time and similarity or self-continuity with the future
self are predictors of long-term survival. After baseline assessment of health and cognitive beliefs and future perspectives of time
andself-continuityaspredictorsofmortality,440participants(ages65to87)werefollowedlongitudinallyfor6.5years.Consistent
withourhypotheses,ﬁndingsdemonstratedthatasigniﬁcantlyhigherpercentageofsurvivorswereindividualswhoshowedhigher
scores on beliefs in a just world and on both the future time perspective and the future self-continuity perspective at the time of
baseline assessments. Conversely, mortality risk was much higher for individuals who scored low on these predictor variables, and
high on distrust. Implications for health and longevity are discussed.
1.Introduction
To date, one of the most understudied etiologies of older
adults’ survival and longevity has been the role of their
cognitive beliefs and worldviews that possibly interact with
their functional and mental capacities to endure, challenge,
overcome, and survive in the face of the numerous struggles
and obstacles in advanced old age.
In earlier research on predictors of mortality, the focus
has been exclusively on variations in physical health and
sociodemographic variables to explain and predict diﬀer-
e n c e si nl o n g e v i t ya n dm o r t a l i t yr a t e sa c r o s saw i d ea g e
range. More recently, studies have explored the relationship
betweenthe5-factorpersonalitytraits[1–4]andotherstress-
inducing traits of perfectionism and dysfunctional depen-
dency traits to predict greater longevity or increased risk of
mortality [5]. The present study presents a clear departure
from earlier studies that have focused on sociodemographic
and personality factors to explain and predict diﬀerences
in all-cause mortality rates in later life. The goal of the
present research is to move outside the personality and traits
model to other second-order cognitive-behavioral factors
to predict diﬀerences in all-cause mortality rates in later
life. Cognitive-behavioral theorists argue on both theoretical
and empirical grounds that individuals’ cognitive beliefs
exert a great deal of inﬂuence on their health, resilience,
and longevity and may logically be assumed to be robust
predictors of impending mortality or conversely of longevity.
However, the ability of cognitive belief systems to predict
important health outcomes of survival and longevity has
traditionally been questioned because of the putative eﬀects
of individuals’ earlier life experiences such as parental loss
and divorce [6]. More recent explorations into individuals’
cognitive beliefs have been drawing attention to a cluster of
beliefssystemsthatmaycountertheeﬀectsofearliernegative
experiences and may serve as strengthening factors toward
enhancing longevity. Recent research using more modern
concepts of evaluating dominant cognitive beliefs and cog-
nitive perspectives of individuals (e.g., beliefs about a just
world (BJW) for self and others, beliefs about one’s future
time, beliefs about one’s self-continuity with the future,
and beliefs about social, political, and interpersonal trust)2 Journal of Aging Research
has provided growing evidence that individuals’ cognitive
beliefs and perspectives are indeed related to health-related
processes [7, 8] leading to longer survival and longevity as
a ﬁnal health outcome. Also, in recent years, the availability
of reliable and valid measures of cognitive beliefs of justice
and fairness [9, 10], future time perspectives [11], and
future self-continuity perspectives [12, 13] has increased
our understanding of the predictive value of individuals’
cognitive beliefs as strengthening or debilitating factors in
health-related outcomes of resilience and longevity.
The present study addresses the relationship between
newly emerging sets of important cognitive belief systems
and the potential for increased longevity. For example, a
number of researchers [10, 14] have demonstrated empir-
ically that individuals’ tenacious cognitive beliefs in a
just world (BJW) society are not only predictive of their
subjective well being and resilience, but more importantly
drive them toward investment in long-term goals and a
commitment to better self-care of health and a longer
life. As a result, life-span scholars are now more keenly
exploring the proactive role that individuals’ beliefs about
a just world (BJW) may play in their future well being and
healthy physical survival (see [15] Tomaka and Blascovitch,
1994), low levels of depression [16], and less loneliness
[17]. Other dominant cognitive beliefs which have been
seen to be related to healthy survival processes or which
present increased risks of mortality include beliefs about
interpersonal trust and trust in key institutions [18, 19].
Individuals who have strong positive beliefs of trust in
the interpersonal and institutional domains are commonly
expected to live lives that are more organized and planned,
as distinguished from lives of instability, anxiety, and caution
[19].Otherperspectivesandbeliefsystemsthatarepredictive
ofplannedhealthysurvivalinclude“FutureTimePerspective
(FTP)” and “Self-Continuity with the Future Perspective”
(FSC). The FTP perspective is a measure of individuals’
perceived belief about how much time participants had left
in life. According to Carstensen [11], the subjective sense
of remaining time has profound eﬀects on basic human
processes, including motivation, cognition, and behaviors.
Withincreasingage,constraintsontimeleftshiftindividuals’
priorities about how remaining time can be protected.
Along somewhat similar lines, the future self-continuity
perspective (FSC) indicates that participants’ beliefs about
their similarity and connection as well as caring and liking
for their future self 10-, 15-, or 20-years from now [13]
determine and shift their motivation to protect the potential
future person. For purposes of the present study, our
underlying conceptual assumption in both these futuristic
perspectives is that individuals who perceive their time
horizons and their self-continuity with the future as more
limited would be more likely to discount the future, and
thus moreunlikely toplanforself-careand self-management
of the future, whereas those who feel the future horizons
are more open-ended and expansive are more likely to plan
and organize for a secure future. Implicit in these per-
spectives is the prediction that individual diﬀerences in the
experience of self-continuity could have positive pragmatic
consequences for future health care and healthy survival.
One logical assumption is that people who experience little
or no continuity with the future self may not aspire to
control future health-related processes whereas people who
experience much similarity or self-continuity with the future
selfarelikelymoremotivatedtoworktowardshapingabetter
survival.
While previous research has demonstrated empirically
the predictive value of the preceding sets of cognitive beliefs
and perspectives in regard to well-being and physical and
mental health-related processes and outcomes, ﬁndings have
been drawn from the study of a wide range of ages. Thus,
there is the question of whether the prognostic value of
these belief systems continues into advanced old age. To
date, the number of longitudinal studies of cognitive beliefs
as predictors of longevity or as risk to mortality in old
age is limited. To address this issue, longitudinal data
obtained exclusively from samples of adults in advanced
age are required. Accordingly, the purpose of our current
research was to examine longitudinally the extent to which
speciﬁc and select sets of cognitive beliefs are enabling,
strengthening, or disabling with respect to long-term health,
resilience, and longevity of older adults and have predictive
value for all-cause mortality in advanced old age. The
question is of increasing interest to health professionals and
gerontologists for both practical and conceptual reasons.
In the section which follows, we review brieﬂy the
research literature that both explains and extends the
assumptions underlying the theory and goals of concepts of
BJW, FTP, and FSC and their potential for predicting longer
survival/or reduced risk for mortality.
2. Conceptual andTheoretical Framework for
the Research
The just world hypothesis and how it may relate to health
and longevity is easily stated. Individuals have a strong need
to believe that they live in a world where people generally
get what they deserve. The belief that the world is just
enables the individual to confront his/her physical and social
environmentasthoughtheywerestableandorderly.Without
such a belief, it would be diﬃcult for the individual to
commit himself/herself to the pursuit of long-range goals
or even to the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day
life. Since the belief that the world is just serves such an
important adaptive function for the individual, people are
very reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly
troubled if they encounter evidence that suggests that the
world is not really just or orderly after all [20]. According
to Lerner and Miller’s just-world theory, people who believe
that the world treats them fairly may plan conﬁdently for
their future, expecting their lives to be orderly, meaningful,
andcontrollable,foreseeingapositivefutureorviewingone’s
living situation as justly deserved and hence fair [21]. In
turn, this expectation promotes mental health, meaning that
the belief in a just world (BJW) can be seen as a “positive
illusion” [22]. Indeed research links BJW to many indices
of subjective well being including a greater purpose in life
and commitment to planned healthy survival [23]. There isJournal of Aging Research 3
empirical evidence showing that individuals who strongly
b e l i ev ei naj u s tw o r l dh a v eb e e ns e e nt oe x p e ri e n c el e s ss tr e s s
and more positive aﬀect than individuals with a weaker BJW
(e.g., [16, 24]).
The preceding conceptual underpinnings and the recent
theory and research related to cognitive beliefs of a just
world (BJW) lend weight to the proposed hypothesis of
our present study that strong BJW beliefs about justice for
the self portend positive social consequences and health-
related beneﬁts for the future. As such, individuals’ strong
cognitive beliefs about a just world (BJW) may be early
predictors of their continued physical and mental well being
at later stages of life and would serve to protect them
against the stress associated with the challenges of later
life.
In the current study, we reason that the predictive power
ofBJWtoenhancelongevityderivesuniquelyfromperceived
justice and BJW beliefs. In light of the preceding discussion,
our leading hypotheses for the current study were (1) that
individuals’ beliefs that the world is just to themselves (BJW-
self) are particularly predictive of their longer term survival
andlongevity,and(2)thattheassociationsbetweencognitive
beliefs of a just world would be observed more powerfully
among measures of BJW for self only (as distinguished
from BJW for others). In essence, we reason that it is the
perception of one’s own, more so than other individuals’,
outcomes that would most powerfully predict longevity or
possible risks of mortality; (3) that individuals’ stronger
levelsofinterpersonaltrustandtrustinthemajorcommunal
institutions (as associated with their perceptions of justice
in the BJW beliefs) are early predictors of their longevity, or
conversely stronger levels of distrust in the major communal
institutions would be associated with increased risk of
mortality.
Arelatedsecondgoalofourcurrentstudywastoexamine
the predictive value of other related cognitive perspectives
such as future time perspectives not previously studied
as predictors of mortality and longevity. On the basis of
postulates derived from Carstensen’s [11] theory on the
inﬂuence of a sense of time on human development (also
see [13, 25]) theory on individual diﬀerences in future self-
continuity, we reason that while time eventually runs out
for all individuals, individuals who hold more expansive and
open-ended future time horizons or who foresee stronger
self-continuity with the future self (compared to those
who hold more limited future time horizons and less self-
continuity with the future self) are less likely to discount
the signiﬁcance of future time and are more invested in
self-preservation for the future. Accordingly, we hypothesize
(4) that individuals’ varying beliefs about future time left
(FTP) and their beliefs about their ability to maintain self-
continuity with the future (FSC) are critical markers or early
predictors of longevity and of the risks of mortality.
While we acknowledge that the preceding associations
between mortality and cognitive beliefs may not have been
apparentinearlyandmiddle-ageadulthood,ourexpectation
is that the associations will be especially observable and
relevant in late life functioning and will emerge as early
markers or predictors of mortality or longevity.
3. Sampling Frame for the Study and
Recruitment of Participants
Participants for the study were randomly recruited from
the registry listings of four branch oﬃces of community
services and community organizations for seniors (Ministry
of Health Services and Health Policy 1992), a governmental
organization responsible at the time for social services and
health policy in Southern Alberta. A sampling strategy with
p r o p o r t i o n a ls t r a t i ﬁ c a t i o ni nf u n c t i o no fg e o g r a p h i c a lz o n e
(metropolitan, urban, or rural) was used to ensure that
the sample was representative of the general population of
older adults living in three big cities and various rural areas
in Southern Alberta. Participants came from three mid-
sized cities (populations ranging from 170,000 to 300,000
individuals) and surrounding suburban and rural areas in
Southern Alberta (Canada). It should be noted that various
levels of community dwellings ranging from upper middle
class private houses to low income apartment housing, and
assisted living homes were included in the ﬁnal recruitment.
Initially 760 brochures brieﬂy describing the research
were mailed on a staggered basis to seniors’ households
requesting individuals’ participation with a one-time oﬀer
of a $30 gift certiﬁcate to compensate for their time.
The purpose of the study was explained as an attempt to
understand older individuals’ beliefs, hopes, expectancies,
and planned goals for the foreseeable future. By the end of
eight weeks, responses were received from 132 individuals
who volunteered their participation. The remaining 628
individuals were subsequently recontacted by mail, and of
these 137 individuals who wanted additional information
about the research were contacted by phone. Another 333
individuals agreed to participate in response to further
advertising andatoasecond and third “Call forParticipants,”
made 3 and 4 months later, bringing the total number of
willingparticipantsto470.Eligibilitycriteriafortheselection
of participants included (1) being 65 yearsor older; (2) being
able to understand, speak, and write English; (3) not having
a diagnosis of cognitive dysfunction registered in the medical
ﬁles; (4) being available for baseline assessments; (5) able to
specify by name, address, phone number, and other relevant
details, one or more family members or care-givers willing to
serve as informants to the research team; (6) willing to sign a
consent form.
3.1. Procedures. The initial interview with each of the 470
participants and their family members took approximately
one-and-a-half hours, with interviews staggered over a
period of 16 weeks. The majority of participants were
interviewed in their homes in order to obtain baseline
information about health status in relation to the chronic
condition presented, to obtain participants’ formal consent
to participate and to arrange for their family member or
primary care giver to contact us periodically concerning the
participant’sgeneralprogress.Typically,twofamilymembers
for each participant contracted to be the informants. There
were 62 husband-wife couple participants. We provided
informants with postage-paid envelopes to contact us at
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the participant’s health status (improving, stable, declining
somewhat, seriously declining), and in the event of the
participant’s death, to provide the exact date of death.
Within the ﬁrst four months of the completion of
baseline assessments for the study, a total of 30 participants
withdrew their participation for a number of reasons, mostly
because of the care-givers’ reluctance to cooperate. Data are
presented for the remaining 440 participants who, following
baselineassessments,stayedtheentire6.5years’courseofthe
study. We wrote “thank you notes” and sent gift coupons
to care givers at every wave of the study, as a token of
appreciation of their continuing participation. There was
no further attrition of participants during the course of the
next 6.5 years. Ascertainment of mortality (date of death)
was done solely on the basis of report of the informants.
Family members preferred that we used this follow-up and
contact procedure because it was more personal and private.
However, as far as possible, we double checked dates of death
against easily accessible local/provincial mortuary listings.
3.1.1. Time Line for the Study. The study comprised 11
waves of data collection. Following a small pilot study, we
conducted in 1995 on study procedures and assessment
scales, baseline measures (wave 1) were obtained between
September and December 2000 in a staggered way, fol-
lowed by 10 subsequent waves of contacts with informants
and/or participants to obtain “summary progress” data on
participants. Contacts were made at approximately eight-
month intervals (240 days apart) till early December 2007,
approximately 6.5 years after baseline.
3.1.2. Assessment of Cognitive Beliefs about a Just World, Inter-
personal Trust and Control, and Perspectives on Future Time
and Self-Continuity with the Future. Participants agreed
to complete paper-and-pencil tests at their own pace, at
home or in their place of study, and approximately 10
percent sought the help of research assistants to record their
responses.
At baseline, participants completed the following.
M e a s u r eo fB e l i e f so faJ u s tW o r l d( B J W ) . BJW were assessed
with a scale originally developed by Lipkus and Siegler [9]
but further improved by B` egue and Bastounis [23], in order
to separate items of BJW pertaining to self from items of
BJW pertaining to others. Participants rated on a scale of 1
(strongly disagree)t o6( strongly agree) 8 items of BJW beliefs
pertaining to the self. Sample items are “I feel that the world
treats me fairly in life,” I feel that I get what I deserve,” “I
feel that my eﬀorts are noticed and rewarded,” I feel that
people treat me with the respect I deserve,” “I feel that I earn
the rewards and punishments I get.” Sample items from the
BJW pertaining to others include “I feel that the world treats
otherpeoplefairly,”“Ifeelthatpeoplegetwhattheydeserve,”
“I feel that people get what they are entitled to get,” “I feel
that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought
it upon themselves.” Scores for BJW (self) and scores for the
BJW (others) ranged from 8 to 48. We used the option of
scoring the BJW-self and BWJ-others as continuous scales.
Higher scores denote stronger BJW beliefs for self and others
rated separately. Cronbach’s alpha were.84 and.74 for the
BJW-Self and BWJ-Others, respectively.
Measure of Future Time Perspective (FTP). FTP was assessed
with the future time perspective scale developed by
Carstensen [26]. Participants rated on a scale from 1 (very
untrue for me) to 7 (very true for me) the degree with which
they agreed with each of 10 items. Sample items are “Many
opportunities await me in the future,” “Most of my life still
lies ahead of me,” “I expect that I will set many new goals
in the future,” “My future seems inﬁnite to me,” “There is
plenty of time left in my life to make new plans,” “I have the
sense that time is running out,” “As I get older, I begin to
experiencetimeaslimited.”Weusedtheoptionofscoringthe
FTP as a continuous scale in the ﬁrst instance. Scores on this
measure ranged from 10 to 70. The high scores represented
a more expansive and open-ended future time perspective.
Cronbach’s alpha for the FTP scale was.82.
Measure of Future Self-Continuity (FSC). FSC was assessed
by means of an adapted psychometric measure of future
self-continuity originally devised by Frederick [12] that used
a single-item measure (i.e., how similar/connected are you
to your past and future self for 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year
intervals on a 1–100 scale?). To facilitate the comprehension
of the concept of continuity, the individual’s endorsement of
similarity between present and future selves was presented
pictorially by a range of ﬁve circles with no overlap to circles
with complete overlap. The index of future self-continuity
featured two questions on 7-point scale marked at each
point by two circles that ranged from showing no overlap
at one end of the scale to depicting almost complete overlap
at the other end (see [27] for circles depicting no overlap
to complete overlap), thus, making the measuring devise
more concretely comprehensible to older adults. Participants
ﬁrst selected the pair of circles that best described how
similar/connected they felt to the future self 15 years from
now, and how much they cared about the future self.
Subsequently, their responses were invited to two questions:
“How connected do you feel to your future self 15 years
from now?” (not at all = 0t overy much = 7). “How much
do you care for your future self?” (not at all = 0t overy
much = 7). We used the option of scoring the FSC scale
(similarity/caring) as a continuous scale in the ﬁrst instance.
Theindexscoreoffutureself-continuityrangedfrom7to35,
and caring for the future self ranged from 7 to 35, assessed in
terms of one continuous total index score ranging from 14 to
70. The high scores represented higher levels of future self-
continuity/caring for future self. Cronbach’s alpha for the
FSC scale was.74.
Interpersonal and Society Trust Measure. Individuals’ degree
of interpersonal trust and trust in the surrounding public
institutions that are perceived to represent justice and
fairness were assessed by means of scale items adapted from
the The Rotter Trust Scale [19]. As a ﬁrst step in adapting
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Likert format, (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree.
An attempt was made to sample a wide variety of social
objects so that a subject would be called upon to express
his/her trust of outside agents, friends, and family members.
Sample items include “In dealing with strangers one is better
oﬀ to be cautious until they have provided evidence that
they are trustworthy,” “Most elected public oﬃcials are not
really sincere in their campaign promises”; “Most friends can
be trusted to support you for life”; “I am able to share my
innermost thoughts and feelings with family because of my
trust in them”; “I do not like to reveal personal information
to outside agents even when they claim to be helping me”;
“I am wary of other people’s motives” “I believe that most
people are basically good and trustworthy”; “I am a private
person and ﬁnd it hard to trust people I do not know well.”
In the ﬁnal form of this scale, the 24 items selected were
similarly balanced. Twelve items indicated trust for agreeing,
and 12 items indicated distrust for agreeing (with the range
of scores for both the trust items and distrust items being 12
to 60). A few ﬁller items were included to disguise the true
purpose of the scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the trust scale and
distrust scale were.77 and.72, respectively.
Spheres of Control [18]. The scale has little or no conceptual
overlap with the BJW scale and, hence, was selected to
provide an independent measure of control. The scale is
comprised of 30 items with the three spheres of control
(personal eﬃcacy, interpersonal control, and sociopolitical
control) each represented by 10 items each rated on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from “disagree” to “agree”. In the
present research, we collapsed the scores across these three
spheres of control because the results of our hypothesis tests
were not aﬀected by distinguishing between them. Specimen
items for the personal eﬃcacy scale, interpersonal scale, and
sociopolitical scale, respectively, include “It’s pointless to
keep working on something that is too diﬃcult for me”;
“When I make plans I am almost certain to make them
work”; “I have no trouble making and keeping friends”;
“I ﬁnd it easy to play an important part in most group
or individual situations”. “In the long run, we as voters
are responsible for bad government on a local or national
level”; “It is diﬃcult for people to have much control over
things politicians do in oﬃces.” The scoring of some items
is reversed before summing the subset. A total index score
for the 30 items was obtained with scores ranging from 30 to
150. Higher scores represent a more internal locus of control.
Cronbach’s alpha for the Control scale was.75.
Measure of Self-Esteem (SEI: [28]). This inventory was used
tomeasureself-esteemasa globaland stabledisposition. The
inventory has 10 items, 5 positively keyed and 5 negatively
keyed. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert type scale.
Cronbach’s alpha for the SEI scale was.88.
Physical Function. Physical Function was assessed by means
of a single item taken from the physical function mobility
index inquiring about one’s ability (yes/no) to climb one
ﬂight of stairs without help. This one-item question was
intended to seek information on physical ﬁtness.
It should be noted that all measures administered to
the participants were formatted in terms of language and
structure appropriate for adults having a ninth-grade edu-
cation. All paper-and-pencil tests and self-report measures
used in the study were previously piloted on a volunteer
group of 20 men and women aged 60 to 80 years. Subsequent
modiﬁcationsweremadeintheinstructionsandillustrations
given for responding to the ﬁve-point ratings of test items.
This procedure was undertaken to ensure that even those
participants who were elderly and had relatively limited
education could validly complete the measures.
3.1.3. Assessment of Health Variables and Family Relationship
Measures. Advanced old age is commonly associated with
an increase in disabilities, higher rates of health care use,
and higher need for social support. Thus, we felt the need
to examine further ﬂuctuations in risk of mortality after
controlling for health-related covariates, which were assessed
as follows:
Survey of Number of Visits to Health Providers. As a part of
a separate survey, respondents listed the number of visits
that they had paid in the previous year to health providers,
including visits to family physicians, community health
clinics, and emergency health units, including hospital visits.
IADL Index of Disability. We based this index on the self-
reported ability for 12 daily living activities included in the
IADL. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they
had experienced limitations in 12 areas of functioning with
responses coded (1) for yes and (0) for no, for example,
able to use a telephone; boarding a bus without assistance;
liftingorcarryinggroceries;personalgroomingandpersonal
hygiene care; doing light house work; taking medications;
walking one block. All the items were summed to form one
index of IADL, with scores ranging from 0 to 12. Cronbach’s
alpha for the IADL scale was.81.
Measure of Satisfaction with Family and Social Support.
Social satisfaction was assessed with 10 items adapted from
Z i m e te ta l .[ 29]. Participants rated how satisﬁed they were
with their social partners in general, and how satisﬁed they
were with their family and relatives on a rating scale ranging
from 1 (very dissatisﬁed)t o3( very satisﬁed). Scores ranged
from 10 to 30. Cronbach’s alpha for the social support
satisfaction scale was.89.
3.2. Data Analysis. We conducted all analyses using the
statistical package for social sciences (Version10). We assessed
the internal consistency of each trait scale with Cronbach’s
coeﬃcient alpha and the association of the scales with
each other and with other covariates by means of Pearson
correlation coeﬃcients. For all analyses, diﬀerences between
survivors and decedents on the date of ﬁnal censoring were
assessed with t-tests and chi-square tests of association.
Cox proportional hazard models [30]w e r eﬁ t t e dt o
estimate the importance of each predictor of mortality. It is
important to note that Cox regression, or the proportional6 Journal of Aging Research
hazards model, is a well-recognized statistical technique
for survival analysis which is concerned with studying
the time between entry to a study and a subsequent
event such as death, as is the case in the present research.
Cox regression has the advantage that it allows for the
simultaneous exploration of the relationship between
survival of persons and several explanatory variables (in
our case variables such as cognitive beliefs, future time
perspectives, control and trust, etc.). Of particular relevance
and interest to our research is that the technique allows
for age adjustment of the calculated hazard ratios across
a wide range of ages, as was the case in our study. (See
“What is a Cox model?,” by Stephen J. Walters, a Haywood
Group plc publication, May 2003, accessible online at http://
www.whatisseries.co.uk/whatis/pdfs/What is Cox model.
pdf); see also G.D. Garson, Statnotes, North Carolina
State University, online at http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu
/garson/PA765/cox.htm) for details of statistical procedures
for achieving adjustment for the eﬀect of age as a covariate.
The Cox regression model assumes that the death rate of the
population depends on a continuous time variable, which
in the present study was the interval between the Wave 1
assessment and date of death, calculated in terms of total
number of days.
In the present study, predictor variables included beliefs
in a just society (BJW: self and others), future time
perspective (FTP), future self-continuity (similarity/caring)
perspective (FSC), demographic variables, and health and
physical functioning variables. The initial risk ratios (IRRs)
(frequently referred to as hazard ratios) are calculated by
exponentiating the beta weight for the predictor [31], and
regressions are expressed in risk ratios and 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. All Cox regression hazard ratios (IRRs)
presented in the present analyses were ﬁrst adjusted for age.
Insubsequentanalyses,wecontrolledforthreehealth-related
covariates (see [3, 5, 32, 33] for signiﬁcance of studying
health variables).
4. Results
Results are reported in two sections corresponding to our
two main research questions. In the ﬁrst section, we examine
key diﬀerences between survivors and decedents in baseline
characteristics of participants. In speciﬁc, we conducted Cox
regression analysis of risk rations of mortality to estimate the
relative risk of death and the importance of each predictor
of mortality for the whole sample. All variables entered
in the Cox regression analysis were entered as continuous
variables for these analyses. In the second section, we present
additional analysis of data where we were unable to derive
easily interpretable results from using Cox regressions of
continuous variable data. Subsequently, we analyzed the
data using categorical variables that we considered were
appropriate for the otherwise continuous variables.
4.1. Key Diﬀerences and Associations between Survivors and
Nonsurvivors (Decedents). Four hundred and forty partic-
ipants were followed starting in December 2000 when
baseline assessments were completed. As of December 2007,
after an average of 6.5 years of observation one hundred and
forty (32%) deaths had occurred, and 300 (68%) survived.
Table 1 provides crude data at baseline on the two subgroups
of decedents and survivors. Those who died during the
study period were somewhat older. Among health-related
variables, the respondents in the two groups were quite
diﬀerent with respect to physical function scores, but not
with respect to number of medical visits reported at time
of baseline assessment, or in respect of number of disabil-
ities reported on the IADL index (see Table 1). Survivors
compared to decedents had signiﬁcantly higher scores on
measures of beliefs in just world (BJW-Self), on the future
time perspective (FTP) and future self-continuity/caring for
the future self (FSC) perspective scale. By contrast, decedents
compared to survivors had signiﬁcantly higher scores on the
measureofdistrustontheinterpersonalandsocietyscaleand
on the control scale.
First, we examined the intercorrelations of measures
of beliefs in a just world (BJW; self and others), future
time perspective (FTP), future self-continuity perspective
(continuity/caring for future self), trust (agreement with
trust items and agreement with distrust items) and control
with one another, and with demographic variables (age and
education), and baseline indicators of number of medical
visits, IADL disability, and satisfaction with social support.
As expected, the two scales of BJW were positively related
to each other, with correlations ranging from.41 to.64; P<
.001. Overall, the BJW-self scale, the FTP scale, and FSC scale
werepositivelycorrelatedwithoneanother,withcorrelations
ranging from.34 to.68; P<. 001. In general, the BJW, FTP,
FSC, and trust measures were not correlated signiﬁcantly
with demographic variables of age and education. The one
notable exception, however, was that the distrust measure
was signiﬁcantly correlated with age and education, with
correlations ranging from.34 to.39; P<. 001 (Note: the
detailed table of correlations is available from the authors on
request).
4.1.1. Psychometric Information on Two Dimensions of BJW
(Self/Others), Two Dimensions of Future Time Perspectives
(Time Left/Self-Connected with Future), Trust/Distrust and
Measures of Self-Esteem and Control. Table 2 provides psy-
chometric information on the predictor variables for mor-
tality risks selected for the research.
Examination of the mean scores for the various scales for
which baseline data were obtained shows that the mean score
ofthecontrolscale(80.1)wasquiteelevatedwhenconsidered
withinthecontextofvaliditynormsoutlinedinPaulhus[18].
However, the mean scores for the BJW, FTP, FSC. Trust and
Distrust scales were consistent with means reported for these
scales elsewhere. The internal consistencies of the various
trait measures as reported in Table 2 are consistent with and
converge appropriately with internal consistencies reported
for the various scales elsewhere (see [10, 12, 19, 25]).
When Cox proportional hazard models adjusted for age
[30] were ﬁtted to estimate the relative risk of death and
the importance of each predictor of mortality for the wholeJournal of Aging Research 7
Table 1: Baseline characteristics of participants who survived (survivors) or died (decedents) Total N = 440.
Characteristics (range of scores) Survivors
N = 300 (68%)
Decedents =
N = 140 (32%)
P Value
Age, years 74.4 (6.3) 78.6 (6.5) <.001
Education, years 14.1 (3.7) 13.9 (3.0) .339
Women 66.0% (291)
Men 34.0% (149)
195; 67%
102; 69%
96; 33%
47; 31%
<.001∗
Beliefs in just world (BJW: self) (8–48) 32.8 (4.1) 20.4 (4.7) <.001
Beliefs in just world (BJW: others) (8–48) 22.7 (2.1) 21.8 (3.0) .461
Future time perspective (FTP) (10–70) 36.8 (6.1) 29.9 (7.6) <.001
Future self-continuity (FSC)—15yrs (14–70) 32.0 (3.5) 24.0 (2.1) <.001
Trust: interpersonal and society (12–60) 33.1 (5.1) 29.5 (6.1) <.05
Distrust: interpersonal and society (12–60) 27.5 (5.1) 39.9 (6.2) <.001
Control (30–150) 69.6 (4.8) 67.0 (5.9) .239
High satisfaction with social support (percentage) 61% 48% <.001
Number of medical visits in preceding year, at baseline: 5.9 (2.1) 6.1 (2.8) .139
Self-esteem (10–30) 16.8 (5.2) 15.9 (6.9) .239
High physical functions score (percentage) 31% 22% <.001
IADL disabilities (12 items) 5.00 (2.0) 6.00 (2.7) .330
Note: All data are presented as mean ratings and (standard deviations) unless otherwise indicated. P values are based on t-tests; ∗denotes variables where P
values are based on χ2 tests of association.
Table 2: Psychometric information on beliefs in just world (self and others) and other related future time perspective measures and trust
measures.
Measures Mean (SD) α
Beliefs in just world (BJW: self) (8–48) 36.6 (6.1) .84
Beliefs in just world (BJW: others) (8–48) 25.7 (5.8) .74
Future time perspective (FTP) (10–70) 39.9 (5.2) .82
Future self-continuity (FSC)—15yrs (14–70) 34.8 (6.1) .74
Agreement with trust items: interpersonal and society (12–60) 37.6 (5.3) .77
Agreement with distrust items: interpersonal and society (12–60) 50.2 (6.9) .72
Control (30–150) 80.1 (10.6) .75
Social support satisfaction (10–30) 22.4 (3.82) .89
Self-esteem (10–40) 23.9 (3.1) .88
Note: The alpha denotes the coeﬃcient alpha, a measure of internal consistency.
sample of 440 participants, the ﬁndings showed that BJW
(self), FTP, and FSC were positively and signiﬁcantly related
to reduced risk of mortality. In other words, scores on these
measures were inversely related to risk of mortality, and
associated with a signiﬁcantly reduced risk of mortality. As
seen in Table 3, BJW (others), trust, self-esteem, and social
support satisfaction were associated with a rather weak or
marginal reduction in risk of mortality. By contrast, distrust
was related to a signiﬁcantly increased risk of mortality.
4.2.ResultsofAdditionalAnalyses. Weconductedahierarchi-
cal regression analysis (N = 440) in order to examine further
the relative contribution of the variables to risk of mortality
(Table 4).
This analysis revealed the ability of BJW-self to predict
risks of mortality over and above other predictor variables.
As seen in Table 4 (Model 1 Model 2), results clearly show
that adding the cognitive beliefs of BJW (self) variable
separately contributed to the explanation of variance in
mortality risks signiﬁcantly and uniquely, over and above
that oﬀered by the three variables of FTP, FSC, and distrust.
In other words, the results in Table 4 conﬁrm that BJW
(self) predicts an association with signiﬁcant reduction in
mortality risks independent of the other predictor variables.
This rules out the sceptical view that the ability of BJW-
Self to predict outcomes is an artifact of correlations with
otherfactorspreviouslyassociatedwithoutcomesofBJW,for
example, control or trust.
4.3. Comparisons of Extreme High Scorers and Extreme Low
Scorers Using Trichotomization. Additionally, we conducted
a preliminary examination of how deaths were distributed
across low, average, and high trait standard scores. Our
inquirysuggestedpossibleviolationsoftheCoxproportional8 Journal of Aging Research
Table 3: Relative risk of death associated with beliefs in just world and other related future time perspective measures and trust measures
(N = 440) (Range of scores).
Measures Relative risk 95% Conﬁdence intervals
Beliefs in just world (BJW: self) (8–48) .798 .706, .892
Beliefs in just world (BJW: others) (8–48) 1.003 .996, 1.014
Future time perspective (FTP) (10–70) .842 .817, .867
Future self-continuity (FSC)—15yrs (14–70) .865 .819, .913
Agreement with trust items: interpersonal and society (12–60) .970 .940, 1.011
Agreement with distrust items: interpersonal and society (12–60) 1.049 .940, 1.158
Control (30–150) 1.005 .996, 1.034
Social support satisfaction (10–30) .945 .929, .969
Self-esteem (10–40) .970 .940, 1.011
Table 4: Hierarchical regression analysis (N = 440) showing ability of BJW-self to predict mortality over and above control, interpersonal
and society distrust, future time perspective, and future self-continuity perspective.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
β t β t
Control .061 .75 .065 1.05
Overall distrust .459 6.18∗∗ .399 4.44∗
Future time perspective .559 6.32∗∗ .456 5.88∗∗
Future self-continuity .479 4.99∗ .407 4.69∗
BJW-self .579 6.92∗∗
Adjusted R2 .475 .523
F change 41.86∗∗ 18.14∗∗
∗P <. 05.
∗∗P <. 001.
hazards assumption. The proportionality assumption is
violated when the relative risk of the outcome does not
change in the same manner for equivalent changes in the
levels of a risk factor or covariate [34]. Categorical variables
may then be appropriate for an otherwise continuous
variable [34] and predictors may be trichotomized based
on broad cut-oﬀ points [35]. Although trichotomization
may reduce statistical power, it has the possible advantage
that trichotomized domain scores will be more readily
interpretable [35]. Accordingly, following scores on each of
thepredictorvariables(convertedtostandardscores),tertiles
were computed for each of the predictor variable subscale
measures. We plotted survival curves showing speciﬁcally
and with greater focus on the relationship of predictor
variables to mortality, with survival rates plotted for extreme
high scorers (at 67th percentile and above)a n dextreme low
scorers (at 33rd percentile and below).
Four survival curves of particular interest and relevance
to our research hypotheses are portrayed in Figures 1 to 3.
Figure 1 showing the survival curve for beliefs in a just
world (BJW-self) suggests that individuals with extreme high
scores (at 67th percentile and above) on this dimension
are at signiﬁcantly reduced risk for mortality compared to
individuals with extreme low scores (at 33rd percentile and
below). The percentages for those who survived in the two
groups are 79.6% and 70.7% percent, respectively, indicating
a9 %d i ﬀerence in mortality. The ratio of fractions of
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Figure 1: Survival in the groups with high and low scores on BJW
(self) over approximately 6.5 years.
decedents to survivors (1 − 0.707)/(1 − 0.796) = 1.433 (see
Figure 1) suggests a 43.3% lower risk of death for extreme
high scorers compared to extreme low scorers. The ﬁndings
fromthesurvivalcurvepresentedinFigure 1furtherconﬁrm
the predictive ability of this measure seen earlier in Table 3Journal of Aging Research 9
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Figure 2: (a) Survival in the groups with high and low scores on
future time perspective over approximately 6.5 years. (b) Survival in
the groups with high and low scores on future self-continuity over
approximately 6.5 years.
where BJW-self was used as continuous variable in the Cox
regression analyses.
Figure 2(a) showing the survival curve for future time
perspectives (FTPs) suggests that individuals with extreme
high scores on this dimension (at 67th percentile and above)
are at a signiﬁcantly reduced risk for mortality compared
to individuals with extreme low scores (at 33rd percentile
and below). The percentages for those who survived in
the two groups are 81.6% and 74.8% percent, respectively,
indicating a 7% diﬀerence in mortality. The ratio of fractions
of decedents to survivors (1 − 0.748)/(1 − 0.816) = 1.370;
(see Figure 2(a)) suggests a 37.0% reduced risk of death for
extreme high scorers compared to extreme low scorers.T h e
ﬁndings from the survival curve presented in Figure 2(a)
further conﬁrm the predictive ability of this measure seen
earlier in Table 3 where future time perspective was used as
continuous variable in the Cox regression analyses.
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Figure 3: Survival in the groups with high and low scores on
Distrust over approximately 6.5 years.
Figure 2(b) showing the survival curve for future self-
continuity perspectives (FSCs) suggests that individuals with
extreme high scores (at 67th percentile and above) on this
dimension are at a signiﬁcantly reduced risk for mortality
compared to individuals withextreme low scores (at 33rd per-
centile and below). The percentages for those who survived
in the two groups are 79.6 and 74.1 percent, respectively,
indicating a 5.5% diﬀerence in mortality. The ratio of
fractions of decedents to survivors (1 − 0.741)/(1-0.796) =
1.267 (see Figure 2(b)) suggests a 26.7% reduced risk of death
for extreme high scorers compared to extreme low scorers. The
ﬁndings from the survival curve presented in Figure 2(b)
further conﬁrm the predictive ability of this measure seen
earlier in Table 3 where the future self-continuity perspective
measure was used as continuous variable in the Cox regres-
sion analyses.
Conversely, the survival curve for distrust (Figure 3)
suggests that individuals with extreme high scores (at 67th
percentile and above) on this dimension, compared with
those with extreme low scores (at 33rd percentile and
below), are at a signiﬁcantly increased risk for mortality. The
percentages for those who survived in the two groups are
80.3% and 74.8%, respectively, indicating a 5.5% diﬀerence
in mortality. The ratio of fractions of decedents to survivors
(see Figure 3)( 1− 0.748)/(1 − 0.803) = 1.276 suggests
a 27.6% higher risk of death for extreme high scorers on
distrust, compared to extreme low scorers. The ﬁndings from
the survival curve presented in Figure 3 further conﬁrm the
predictiveabilityofthismeasureseenearlierinTable 3 where
the distrust measure was used as continuous variable in the
Cox regression analyses.
To sum up the results, when the tertile split analysis
was done, BJW (self), future time perspectives (FTPs)
and future self-continuity perspectives (FSCs) were found
to be diﬀerentially associated with mortality risks. When
BJW (self) scores, future time perspective scores, and self-
continuity or similarity with the future self scores were10 Journal of Aging Research
Table 5: Relative risk of death associated with cognitive beliefs, future perspectives, and related traits after adjusting for three covariates
entered in the multiple regression analysis.
Trait β F Multiple RR 2 Risk ratio model
RR 95% CI
Covariates combined .54 6.55∗∗
BJW (Self) −.48 5.91∗∗ .51 .26 .832 .809, .855
BJW (Others) .15 <1.00 .24 .06 1.004 .990, 1.018
FTP (Future time) −.41 5.21∗∗ .34 .12 .852 .809, .895
FSC (Future similarity) −.31 4.27∗∗ .28 .08 .842 .816, .868
Trust: agreement −.18 2.02∗ .20 .04 .976 .962, .990
Distrust: agreement .37 4.57∗∗ .26 .07 1.048 1.024, 1.072
Self-esteem −.16 <1.00 .20 .04 .998 .964, 1.032
Social support satisfaction −.29 2.01∗ .17 .03 .935 .907, .963
Control .21 2.11∗ .14 .02 1.005 .996, 1.034
Total .72
∗P<05; ∗∗P<. 001; Degrees of freedom for F = 12,424.
Covariates include: participants’ (1) number of visits to health providers at baseline, (2) IADL index score for disability at baseline, and (3) satisfaction with
family and friends support. Note: covariates were entered simultaneously. Relative risk ratio (RR) and conﬁdence intervals (CIs) were determined after means
were adjusted for covariates.
extremely low (33rd percentile and below), mortality risk
was signiﬁcantly greater,c o m p a r e dt oextremely high scores
on these measures (67th percentile and above). In other
words, high scores on these measures represented reduced
risk to mortality. However, the variable of distrust revealed
a somewhat contrasting pattern in the tertile analysis. When
distrust scores were extremely low (33rd percentile and
below), mortality risk was signiﬁcantly lower,c o m p a r e dt o
extremely high distrust scores (67th percentile and above)
which were associated with an increase in mortality risk.
4.4. Controlling for Health-Related Variables. In a separate
set of regression analyses, we explored the inﬂuence of
three health-related covariates (Table 5). These analyses were
intended mainly to see whether diﬀerences in cognitive
predictorsofmortalitywouldbemaintainedaftercontrolling
for three health-related covariates assessed at baseline: (1)
number of visits in the previous year to medical practitioners
and health providers, (2) total index score for the measure of
disability (IADL) in daily life activities, and (3) total score
for self-rated satisfaction with family and social support.
Initially, these health-related covariates were controlled for
one at a time, using a Cox regression analysis procedure.
However, the results of the Cox regression analyses were
ambiguous. We then re-ran the analysis using multiple
regression, adjusting for the covariates (Table 5).
As seen in Table 5, the negative beta values for beliefs in
a just world, future time perspective, future self-continuity,
and social support satisfaction, and the signiﬁcant F values
observed in the multiple regression analysis are consistent
with the direction of reduced risk ratios shown in the
relative risk (RR) and 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) model
(Table 3). Similarly, after adjusting for the covariates, the
positive direction of the beta values and the signiﬁcant F
values for distrust in the multiple regression analyses is
consistent with the direction of increased risk ratios for this
variable in the relative risk (RR) and 95% CI model. Thus,
overall,therelationshipbetweencognitivebeliefsaboutajust
world, future time perspectives, and risks for mortality were
maintained after adjusting for the health-related covariates.
In other words, the direction of the association we saw in the
earlier Cox regression analyses (Table 3) between scores on
cognitive beliefs, future perspectives, distrust, and risks for
mortalityremainedunchangedafteradjustingforthehealth-
related covariates.
In further analyses, we found no statistically signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀects among the sociodemographic variables
and health variables relating to the prediction of mortality.
5. Discussion andInterpretationof Results
5.1. Beliefs in Just World (BJW-Self). Consistent with our
hypothesis, our ﬁndings from the Cox regression analysis of
the predictor variable of BJW revealed that BJW is positively
related to survival. Additionally, our ﬁndings based on a
hierarchical regression analysis of a two-model design show
that the variable of BJW (self) had stronger ability than
all other cognitive variables explored in this research to
predict mortality risk. These ﬁndings lend weight to recent
theory and research suggesting that the predictive power of
BJW-self seems to derive uniquely from perceived justice
and that most persons have a strong need to perceive the
world to be just, a belief system that conceivably serves
to protect their health and survival [10, 14, 23]. Our
ﬁndings that high levels of beliefs about justice and fairness
are early predictors of longer survival are consistent with
our hypothesis. These ﬁndings advance and extend the
assumptions of earlier researchers’ work on perceived justice
and fairness [9, 10] as linked to better health and well
being. Our ﬁndings show that individuals’ concern that the
world is just to themselves, as distinguished from others, is
particularly predictive of their healthy survival. Along with
earlier researchers, we speculate that BJW for self contributes
to a larger extent to individuals’ psychosocial adjustment,Journal of Aging Research 11
providing them with useful resources in times of stress,
and correspondingly becomes linked with reduced risks of
mortality. In our study, BJW (others) was not diﬀerentially
linked with mortality risks. However, we cannot conclude
that BJW-Self alone generates the link with reduced risk of
mortality. Consequently, the mortality correlates with BJW
in the spheres of self and others remain to be determined
more fully.
5.2. Future Time Perspective. Overall we predicted that while
time is ﬁnite and limited for all, an increased or more expan-
sive or open-ended future time perspective would reduce the
risk of mortality, based on a logical assumption that a more
expansive view on time left may promote valuation of future
plans to safeguard the future self and protect it against risks
of mortality. Consistent with our hypothesis, our ﬁndings
from the Cox regression analysis (adjusted for age) show
that an expansive future time perspective is associated with a
reduced risk of mortality for our older sample. Our ﬁndings
lend support to earlier postulates that the subjective sense
of time plays an essential role in human motivation, and
gradually time left becomes a better predictor than a range
of other cognitive variables that contribute to behavioral and
psychological processes at work in old age [11]. The present
direction of ﬁndings advances and extends assumptions of
future time perspectives proposed by previous researchers
(e.g., [12]) according to whom individuals’ perceptions
of remaining time to live determines their potential for
evaluating and shaping future time and future prospects
concerning identity and health. Extrapolating from our
ﬁndings, we speculate that incorporating an expansive time
horizon inﬂuences individuals to pay relatively greater atten-
tion in the time left to make pragmatic and more practical
decisions concerning a healthier future life. Additionally,
we speculate that individuals in our sample who showed
more expansive or open-ended time horizons at the time of
baseline assessment would have already maximized attempts
to preserve and protect future personal health and survival.
However, our ﬁndings suggest that older adults’ perception
of time left is linked rather nonspeciﬁcally with risks of
mortality. It remains for future researchers to disentangle the
speciﬁc psychological processes that link limited horizons of
time left with increased risk of mortality.
5.3. Future Self-Continuity. Overall, we predicted that in-
creased future self-continuity and caring for future self
would reduce the risk of mortality, based on a logical
assumption that increased future self-continuity perceptions
may promote the valuation of future plans to safeguard
the future self and to protect it against risks of mortality.
Consistent with our hypothesis, our ﬁndings from the Cox
regression analysis (adjusted for age) show that future self-
continuity as a variable is associated with reduced risk of
mortality. Extreme high scorers on future self-continuity and
caring for the future (i.e., individuals who perceived greater
similarity between their present and future self), compared
with extreme low scorers (i.e., individuals who perceived
minimum similarity between their present and future self)
hadasigniﬁcantlyreducedriskofmortality(37%).Although
the present results cannot specify the causal direction of the
association between future self-continuity and reduced risk
of mortality nor specify the health-related processes at work
to explain this association, the research ﬁndings provide
initial evidence that high similarity and high self-continuity
withfutureselfisasigniﬁcantpredictoroflongevity.Overall,
our ﬁndings ﬁt well with the philosophical analysis by Parﬁt
[36] that individuals who feel similar to their future selves
are more likely to make more prudent decisions for the
future, including health-related decisions, because of their
perceivedcloseconnectednesstothefutureself.Alternatively,
we speculate that individuals who perceived their current
physical and mental health to be stable at the time of baseline
assessments were also able to identify better with their future
self as being one of healthy survival and, therefore, worth
protecting. Many questions remain. Of particular interest, in
the context of a longitudinal study, is the initial evidence that
behavioraldiﬀerencesinlongevityaredrivendiﬀerentiallyby
perceived future self-continuity.
5.4. Trust/Distrust. Our ﬁndings from the Cox regression
analysis, showing that high distrust predicted a signiﬁ-
cantly increased risk of mortality, are consistent with our
hypothesis. These ﬁndings are not at variance with earlier
theoretical proposals suggesting that historically older adults
have had diﬃculty in accepting the status quo as deﬁned
by younger authorities in the social system and may tend
to be more distrusting of those authorities. Our ﬁndings
suggest that extreme high levels of distrust which typiﬁed
some individuals in our sample, compared with extreme low
levels of trust, increased the risk of mortality by 27.6 percent.
Overall, the Cox regression analysis revealed that distrust
is empirically predictive of an increased risk of mortality.
W es p e c u l a t et h a th i g hl e v e l so fd i s t r u s tm a yb ea n a l o g o u s
to a form of pathological social isolation or breakdown in
communications that leads to increased risk for physical and
psychological disease [37, 38]. Conceivably distrust becomes
linked with a shorter life span.
5.5. Study Limitations. Despite the novelty of our data, and
thus the importance of their contribution to cognitive eti-
ology of health-related processes such as survival, mortality,
or longevity, our study was subject to the limitation that the
sample was a volunteer one. Our cognitive scale measures
of beliefs in a just world, and other measures exploring
individuals’ perspectives on future self-continuity and future
time, trust and distrust were self-report measures and
subject to the biases associated with self-report measures.
The preceding sources of unreliability of measurement
could potentially both reduce or increase the proportion of
variance in the outcome variables for which our models were
able to account. However, we are conﬁdent that we had a
suﬃciently large and representative sample of urban and
rural older adults, and the measures we used showed high
internal consistency.
5.6. Conclusions. Our study provided novel indications that
cognitive belief systems and future time perspectives of12 Journal of Aging Research
older adults may have much to contribute to increased or
reduced mortality risks in late life. Thus, we suggest that
basic cognitive beliefs and future time perspectives that were
examined in the present research for their association with
increased or reduced risk for mortality are an important
directionforfutureresearch.Itremainsforfutureresearchers
to try to integrate these various cognitive factors into
some kind of theoretical frameworks to gain a precise
appreciationofhow thesefactorsmaybe causallylinked with
longevity.
5.7. Practical Implications for Clinical Practice. Extrapolating
from the ﬁndings of the study concerning the association
between beliefs in a just world and the potentials for a
longer survival, it may be reasonable to postulate that the
ﬁndings have possible implications for clinical practice with
older adults who may be dealing with traumatic life events
such as life threatening illness, loss of loved ones, and other
natural disasters. It is conceivable that these individuals
may, as a result of adverse and stressful experiences, feel an
abrupt decline in their beliefs in a just world or a decline
in their faith or trust in interpersonal connectedness. It is
suggested that clinicians be particularly mindful of clients
who score extremely low on measures of BJW and future
time perspectives. Conceivably, they are at greater risk of
mortality. Similarly, those individuals scoring extremely high
on measures of distrust and control may be at greater risk
of mortality. By exploring with older clients their beliefs
about a just world and their trust or faith in interpersonal
connectedness, geriatric service providers and psychologists
may be able to assist clients to develop a realistic self-
proﬁle of their sources of life strengths in relation to self-
growth, resilience, and control over every day life situations.
Thus, clinicians may be able to assist elderly clients to
draw on internal sources of strengths, such as reﬂecting
on their beliefs about a just world and their beliefs about
trusting others, as a means to strengthening and enhancing
future self-continuity. Based on our ﬁndings suggesting
that individuals’ strong beliefs in a just world and positive
perspectives regarding future time may possibly protect
them against risk to mortality, geriatric service providers are
encouragedtoengageinadialoguewiththeirclientsonthese
themes. Such dialogues may not only serve to act as buﬀers
for clients against stress and anxiety about the future, but
may also assist clients in building up greater motivation for
living.
From a pragmatic standpoint, we postulate that inter-
ventions aimed at strengthening individuals’ beliefs in a
just world at an earlier age, and encouraging future-self
continuity in the earlier adulthood years, might motivate
people to care more for their potential person in the later
years, and conceivably keep people healthier longer and
thereby reduce risk of mortality. Similarly, communica-
tion programs that foster interpersonal and institutional
trust or help older adults combat high levels of distrust
(which in our research were associated with signiﬁcantly
increased risk of mortality) may be of value to a longer
survival.
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